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Article
The Duty to Rescue and the Duty
to Aid the Starving

Per Bauhn
In this article I intend to argue that while there are certainly important similarities
between the duty to rescue and the duty to aid the famine-stricken and starving, there are
also important differences between these two duties. Both the duty to rescue and the duty
to provide aid need to be qualified by conditions regarding necessity, possibility, and
comparable cost, as well as by a principle concerning special relationships of
responsibility. However, while the duty to rescue can be fulfilled by individual agents, the
duty to aid the famine-stricken and starving requires large-scale interventions to change
political and social structures, involving the interactions of governments rather than the
interactions of individuals.
In his famous 1972 article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer argued that
we, to the extent that we are comparatively rich citizens of developed countries, have a
duty to give aid to famine-stricken people in underdeveloped countries. Singer based this
duty on an intuitively appealing moral principle, which I, following the example of other
philosophers, like Richard Arneson (Arneson 2004: 33) and Kwame Anthony Appiah
(Appiah 2006: 160), will refer to as the Singer Principle, stating that “if it is in our power
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to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972: 231).
According to Singer himself, this principle applies both locally and globally. Locally it
justifies an interpersonal duty to rescue. Globally it justifies a duty for individuals as well
as governments to aid victims of famines to prevent them from starving to death.
In this article, I intend to argue that (1) the duty to rescue is more limited in
scope than the Singer Principle suggests, and that (2) the duty to aid the starving cannot
be derived from the duty to rescue in the way Singer thinks. Requirements of necessity
and reasonable costs as well as priorities justified by special relationships limit the
extension of positive duties in general, including the duty to rescue. All of us do not
always have a duty to prevent bad things from happening, and when we do have such a
duty, we do not owe it to all persons equally. Moreover, what is necessary to end a
famine is very different from what is necessary to rescue people from drowning and other
kinds of lethal dangers, and since necessity plays an important role in the justification of
any moral duty, this difference should affect how we think of the duty to rescue and the
duty to aid the starving, respectively.
This does not mean that there is no duty to aid the starving. Nor does it mean
that individual citizens of rich countries are not doing a good thing when they donate
money to, for instance, Doctors without Borders. But it does mean that they do not,
typically, have a moral duty to do so.
To point out these limits to our duties to help other people should not be
considered as an expression of indifference toward those in need of help. Rather, it has to
do with fairness. All duties imply the imposition of burdens on agents and restrictions on
their right to freedom. Hence, given that agents have good reasons to value their freedom,
such duties should not be assigned to them beyond what is morally and causally
necessary.

THE QUESTION OF THE RELEVANCE OF GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY
Peter Singer provides the following example to illustrate the meaning of his principle:
Imagine that you pass a shallow pond in which a child is about to drown. You can easily
save the child by simply stepping into the pond and pull her out. You will muddy your
trousers and probably ruin your shoes in the process, but otherwise there will be no costs
for you. Do you have a duty to wade in and pull the child out? I believe most of us would
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agree with Singer that you do. As he observes, compared to the child’s death, the damage
to your clothes does not really matter, and hence you are morally obligated to save the
child.
Now, Singer moves on to try to convince us that if we accept this conclusion,
then we should also accept that we have a similar moral obligation to help famine victims
across the globe. His principle takes no account of proximity or distance: “It makes no
moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards from me or
a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away” (Singer 1972: 231–
32). This we can label the Condition Regarding the Irrelevance of Proximity. Moreover,
the Singer Principle “makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person
who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the
same position” (Singer 1972: 232). This we can call the Condition Regarding the
Irrelevance of Numbers.
It is because of the Condition Regarding the Irrelevance of Proximity that the
Singer Principle can be extended to cover not only standard rescue situations, in which
rescuer and rescuee are locally and temporally intimately connected, but also aiding the
distant needy. And it is because of the Condition Regarding the Irrelevance of Numbers
that the category of potential providers of aid can be extended to include any individual
with sufficient means in a developed country, regardless of whether or not her particular
contribution is necessary to the saving of any lives.
However, both of these conditions are problematic, since neither proximity nor
numbers are irrelevant to the justification of the duty to rescue. Let us begin by looking at
problems related to the Condition Regarding the Irrelevance of Proximity.
First of all, we may well agree with Singer that geographical proximity should
not matter to the question whether or not we have a duty to rescue. If I have access to an
electronic device which both informs me that someone is about to drown in a far away
country, and enables me to rescue that person by simply pressing a button, and if pressing
the button is both necessary to the rescuing of the drowning person, and does not involve
any morally relevant costs for me or anyone else, then I have a moral duty to press the
button and save the drowning person. (The meaning of “morally relevant costs” will be
discussed later in this article.) I have in this case a duty to rescue which is just as strong
as it would have been had the drowning person been in my immediate vicinity, for
instance, in a pond that I was passing on my way to work.
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F. M. Kamm has argued that geographical distance could indeed matter, in the
sense that our duty to rescue people who are far from us is less demanding than our duty
to rescue people who are near us, and that “as the costs involved in acting go up, a duty to
aid a distant person may be defeated whereas a duty to aid a near person would not be”
(Kamm 2004: 70). Now, we may intuitively be less disposed to spend a certain sum of
money to save a rescuee whom we will never see or know anything about than to spend
the same sum of money to rescue a person from dying in front of our eyes. But while this
may tell us something about the human capacity for sympathy, I do not believe it tells us
anything significant about our moral duties. To the extent that the rights of the distant
needy and the near needy are equally deserving of our support, and to the extent that
neither rescue operation requires that we sacrifice any part of our own basic well-being, it
would seem reasonable to conclude that our duty to rescue the distant needy is as strong
as our duty to rescue the near needy. Hence, I believe that Singer is right when he holds
that geographical distance, taken by itself, does not matter morally.
However, as Violetta Igneski has pointed out, distance may serve as a proxy for
other and morally relevant aspects of a situation that calls for our intervention. When the
person or persons in need are near us it appears very clear what must be done and by
whom. When the person or persons in need are far away from us it becomes less obvious
that they and no one else should be the target of our help. If a child is drowning some
yards away and you can pull her out of the water at no serious cost to yourself, then it
seems obvious that you should do this. But if you receive information that people are
starving in a far away country, helping them becomes just one of many ways in which
you can fulfill your moral duty to help distant people in need. As you already know,
people are in need of help in many places of the world.
For instance, you could just as well choose to provide aid to victims of an
earthquake in another far away country, or to help funding efforts to eliminate malaria in
some other part of the world. The duty to rescue, according to Igneski, applies to morally
determinate situations, in which it is clear that a particular agent must perform a
particular action in order to save a particular recipient’s life, while the more general duty
to aid applies to morally indeterminate situations, in which the agent has many options as
to whom to help and what to do to help them. Unfortunately, the distinction between
morally determinate and morally indeterminate situations is often conflated with the one
between near and far recipients of help:
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Whenever we may think that distance makes a difference it is really the
determinacy of the situation that explains this difference. Thus when
the victim is near the agent, we think the agent has an obligation to aid
this person not because they are close to each other but because their
closeness makes it more likely that there is a specific act that the agent
at the scene can do to end the peril (and thus it is a morally determinate
situation). When the agent and victim are distant, it is much less likely
that there is some specific act that is morally required of this specific
agent—and so it is not the fact that they are distant from each other that
explains why the agent is not bound to do something in this particular
situation but that the situation is not morally determinate. (Igneski
2001: 612)
I believe Igneski is on the right track here, but that her argument preferably could be
stated in terms of necessity. What makes a particular rescue situation morally determinate
as regards a particular potential rescuer’s duty to intervene is not that her intervention is
more likely to be successful here than it would be somewhere else, but that her
intervention here is necessary. It is the necessity of a particular agent’s intervention that
creates the duty to rescue as well as the duty to aid, and it is the necessity of political
agency that makes the duty to aid the starving a duty of states and governments rather
than a duty of individual agents. I will return to these questions below.

THE QUESTION OF THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL PROXIMITY
Proximity can be understood not only in geographical, but also in moral terms. Moral
proximity involves a particular relationship between persons that justifies special moral
expectations and responsibilities. Parents have duties to their own children that they do
not have to children in general. Likewise, friends, lovers, and soldiers of a platoon on a
battlefield expect each other to have a concern for each other’s well-being that goes
beyond the concern they have for people’s well-being in general.
Moreover, by means of various contracts and agreements agents may acquire
special responsibilities for particular other persons that they do not have in relation to
people in general. For instance, by voluntarily accepting employment as a bodyguard or
as a lifeguard an agent contracts herself to protect a particular person’s life or the people
swimming in the waters of a particular beach area. The bodyguard has duties concerning
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the safety of the person she is employed to protect that she does not have to anyone else,
and she might even be expected to risk her life for that person. The lifeguard has a duty to
rescue those persons who are about to drown in that particular beach area which she is
employed to protect and nobody else, and she has duties regarding their safety that no one
else has.
Likewise, the citizens of a democracy have duties to each other and to their
political community that they do not have to members of other nations and their political
communities. These civic duties are mainly about protecting the institutions that uphold
civic rights, including among these institutions the state itself. Hence, citizens have a duty
to contribute to the defence of their political community in times of war, and to contribute
to the financing of public goods like law enforcement, schools, and medical care, in
accordance with the decisions made by the citizens themselves or by their elected
representatives. At the same time they have no similar duty to support public goods in
other countries. The duties of democratic citizenship should not be viewed as antithetical
to the universality of human rights, however. Instead, the particularities of democratic
states can be seen as so many political applications of the universal right to freedom:
“The democratic state is the institution that has the authority to define what equal
freedom requires over a given portion of the earth” (Stilz 2009: 89).
It is, of course, a matter of dispute how far these particular duties extend. We are
not morally permitted to leave a stranger’s child to drown (when only we can rescue that
child, and we can do it at no risk to ourselves) just for the sake of not having our plan to
buy an ice-cream for our own child interfered with. Obviously, not only relationships, but
also the importance of the goods at stake should matter. Likewise, a bodyguard may well
have to accept risks for herself in the line of her work, but she is not permitted to expose
innocent bystanders to the same risks just for the sake of protecting her employer. Nor
should we accept nationalist conceptions of civic duties that include xenophobic or
chauvinist aggressions against other nations or national minorities within one’s own
political community. Here is not the place to explore the ethics of special responsibilities.
For our purposes it is sufficient that we note that there exists such responsibilities and
that they are relevant to our understanding of positive duties in general and of the duties
to rescue and to aid the starving in particular.
Now, when Singer says that it should not matter whether the rescuee is “a
neighbor’s child…or a Bengali whose name I shall never know,” he seems to rule out the
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relevance of not only geographical proximity but also of moral proximity. Given that
your relation with your neighbour qualifies as indeed “neighbourly,” that is, friendly,
although not necessarily intimate, you would have a reason to care for the well-being of
her child in a way that you do not care for the well-being of children in general. Living in
the same building, or at least in the same block of houses, knowing each other’s name,
meeting and greeting each other perhaps every day, sometimes chatting and sharing small
confidences with each other, maybe doing each other small favours—all these friendly
exchanges create mutual expectations regarding support, should the need arise.
Hence, your neighbour would be justified in expecting you to care for her child
in a way that goes beyond the care you extend to children in general. If she needs to leave
home and has no other family member that can look after her child, she is more likely to
ask you than she is to ask a perfect stranger to babysit. And while you reasonably could
turn down a suggestion to babysit a complete stranger’s child, you cannot turn down your
neighbour’s request with an equal ease. Of course, neighbourliness should work both
ways. You are entitled to expect your neighbour to bring up her children to be
functioning members of the local community, being polite and caring rather than being
prone to vandalizing your property or yelling insults at you. Neighbourliness is in this
sense a kind of a social contract, with a mututality of rightful expectations. (How far this
mutuality extends is, of course, another matter.)
In Singer’s account, the neigbour’s child is contrasted with “a Bengali whose
name I shall never know,” that is, someone who is a complete stranger. Hence, Singer’s
point is to underline the unimportance of whether or not we are acquainted with the
rescuee. But this is not how human social relations work. If your neighbour was told that
you chose to babysit a stranger’s child instead of hers, then she would indeed have a
reason to question the neighbourliness of your relation.

SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE DUTY OF RESCUE
We need not reject the idea that we may well have duties to strangers. But if we choose to
rescue a stranger at the cost of failing to rescue our child, friend, lover or any other
person with whom we have involved ourselves in a sufficiently close manner, then we
can be justly accused of being morally tone-deaf. Likewise, if we neglect to protect the
people we have voluntarily committed ourselves to protect in order to secure the wellbeing of some other people, then we can be justly criticized for having the wrong

The Duty to Rescue and the Duty to Aid the Starving 11
priorities. Personal or contractual relations that we voluntarily create (as in the case of
friends and co-workers) or at least voluntarily maintain (as in the case of democratic
citizenship) bring with them rightful expectations and justified special positive duties. By
committing ourselves to a personal relationship or by contracting ourselves to protect
other persons’ basic well-being, we give these other persons reasons to rely on our
support. Accordingly, agents who fail persons to whom they stand in a special
relationship, leaving them to die or to suffer serious injuries without even trying to help
them, can be considered as some kind of traitors: “By voluntarily accepting those duties
in the first place, they created the very trust they later violated” (Feinberg 1987: 154).
Hence, when we face a conflict between upholding the basic well-being of
people to whom we stand in a special relationship and upholding the same level of wellbeing of other people, our duty is to protect the basic well-being of those to whom we
stand in a special relationship. We will call this the Principle of the Priority of Special
Relationships.
This principle does not imply that we never need to care about the well-being of
strangers. For instance, my duty to rescue the drowning child in the pond does not depend
on the child being mine or on me knowing the child’s parents. Instead, I have a duty to
save that child because only I can do it and because I can do it without risking anything
of comparable moral significance.
But if I am confronted with two ponds, each one containing a child about to
drown, and I can save only one of them, then it should matter to my choice of action if
one of the children is mine. No one can blame me for not being able to do the impossible.
Hence, the mere fact that I save only one child does not make me a bad person. But if I
choose to let my own child drown for the sake of saving the other child, then it would be
reasonable to argue that I am a bad parent. As a parent I am not supposed to be
indifferent to whether it is my own child or somebody else’s child that drowns. On the
contrary, I am supposed to arrange my priorities so that I save my own child before I try
to save any other child. This is what my child has a right to expect from me. Hence, as
Richard Miller has pointed out,
not only can reasons for special concern deriving from special
relationships make the expression of impartial concern non-obligatory,
if they are sufficiently important they can make impartial conduct
wrong. (Miller 2004: 103)
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This does not mean that I am morally justified in running over and killing another child
with my car just to get in time to the pond where my child is about to drown. If I run over
and kill a child, I am violating her right to life, even if I am doing it for the sake of saving
my own child’s life. The other child has done nothing to deserve having her right to life
infringed. It is not her fault that my child is about to drown. Hence, her right to life
should be as inviolable as the similar right of my child.
However, in the case in which I have to choose between the two ponds, I am not
violating the rights of the other child when I choose to save my own child first, although
one consequence of my choice will be that the other child drowns. It is not as if I am
drowning the other child for the sake of saving my own child. It is merely that I choose to
save my own child first, knowing well that this means that the other child cannot be
saved and will drown. Of course, the other child, too, has a right to be saved, and if
possible I should save both children. My child, however, has a right not only to be saved,
but to be prioritized by me, being her parent. Another rescuer, completeley unrelated to
any of the children about to drown, would have been free to toss a coin to decide whom
to save, but for me to do so would indicate a severe lack of understanding of what is
involved morally in the relationship between parent and child.
Now, the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships assigns priorities not
only among rescuees but also among rescuers. In the above example of me and my child
the principle says not only that I should give priority to my own child over other children
in a rescue situation, but it says also that if I am there with many other persons who, like
me, would be capable of rescuing my child, it is still I who have the duty to rescue my
child. Only if I would be unable to do so would there be a moral duty for other agents to
rescue my child. Being a parent, I have a moral responsibility for my child that no one
else has, and as long as I am capable of protecting my child’s basic well-being, it is my
duty and no one else’s to do so.
As we have already seen, special relationships are not only about family
members, friends, lovers, and other kinds of people with whom we have chosen to
involve ourselves personally. They also include contractual relations, in which we, as a
part of our voluntarily chosen line of work, or as a part of promises, agreements, or as a
consequence of our civic and legal responsibilities, have acquired morally justified duties
to other people.
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In a rescue situation, if there are many potential rescuers around and one of them
has a contractual duty to rescue that the others do not have, and if this agent is capable of
rescuing a particular person who is in danger, then she, and she alone, will be morally
responsible for that person’s life. Imagine, for instance, a case in which the following is
true:
(1) A man is about to drown.
(2) On the beach there are ten persons, each and every one of whom is
capable of rescuing the drowning man on her own.
(3) One of these ten persons is a lifeguard, employed to maintain the
safety of this particular beach area.
In a situation like this, the lifeguard, and she alone, is morally responsible for the
drowning man’s fate. If all ten persons choose to remain passive and the man drowns, it
is the lifeguard who is to be blamed for this. Unlike the others, she has voluntarily
committed herself to rescue anyone in need in this particular area and she is able to fulfill
this duty. Hence, no one else should be expected to step in and assume responsibility for
the rescue of the drowning man. Only if the lifeguard is unable to intervene will the
moral responsibility for the drowning man’s fate pass on to the other persons present at
the scene. If, on the other hand, it is just a matter of the lifeguard being unwilling to
intervene, nothing changes, morally speaking, and the duty to rescue still remains with
her. (It would of course be very nice and highly laudable if one of the other potential
rescuers stepped in and fulfilled the duty that the lifeguard chose to ignore, but this other
person would have no moral duty to do so.)
Here Joel Feinberg’s distinction between non-doing and omitting seems to
apply. Feinberg gives the case of A who is B’s tenant and who has promised to water B’s
flowers while B is away but instead leaves them to wilt and die, although he could have
saved them easily, and C, who is B’s neighbour and who is also able to water B’s
flowers, but has made no promise to B to do so, and chooses to do nothing. In this case,
Feinberg argues, A had a duty to water B’s flowers, but C had no such duty. Hence, while
A’s non-fulfillment of his promise to B should be described as an omission, the same
does not apply to C, since “although it is true that C did not water the flowers, it does not
follow that C omitted to water them” (Feinberg 1987: 161). Likewise, if a lifeguard
ignores a drowning person whom she could and should rescue, then she is guilty of an
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omission, but the other persons present should only be described as not-intervening,
without any moral blame necessarily attached to their passivity.
Hence, according to the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships, if
there is an agent with a personal or contractual duty to rescue a certain person in need or
persons in need in general, and that agent is capable of fulfilling her duty, then other
agents are relieved of their duty to rescue these persons. This is in line with the
assumption that duties should not be assigned to agents beyond what is necessary, since
all duties imply the imposition of burdens and restrictions on the freedom that all agents
should consider as a necessary good. The argument about omissions and non-doings in
relation to the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships will also have significant
consequences for our analysis of the duty to aid the starving.
Now, the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships can create tragic
dilemmas of its own. Here is an example. Your child is about to drown in one pond and
another child is about to drown in another pond, and you are a lifeguard, responsible for
the safety of that other pond. You have time to save only one child. How should you
choose? Here you seem to be caught in a trap. Either you will have to fail as a parent or
you will have to fail as a lifeguard, and in either case a child for whom you have a special
responsibility will die. Here, I believe, your moral duty is to give priority to the child in
the pond that you have contracted yourself to keep safe. When you work as a lifeguard, it
should be a part of your professional commitment that nothing should be allowed to
distract you from your duties regarding the safety of the swimmers and bathers in the
pond that you are responsible for. Moreover, you should arrange your private life so that
someone else will take care of your own child and protect her safety while you are on
work.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NECESSITY IN RELATION TO MORAL DUTIES
Now, let us turn to the Condition Regarding the Irrelevance of Numbers. As we know,
this condition “makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who
could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same
position” (Singer 1972: 232). Hence, whether my action is necessary or not is irrelevant
as long as it is sufficient to achieve or at least to promote the achievement of a certain
humanitarian end.
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Contrary to Singer’s assumptions, I will claim that necessity is quite crucial to
the question of whether or not we have duties to rescue or to aid the starving. This is so
since necessity is essential to the justification of duties in general, whether these duties
are of the negative or the positive variety. To assign a duty to an agent is to impose a
burden on her. It is to restrict her sphere of morally permissible actions by making the
non-performance of some actions as well as the performance of some other actions
morally mandatory for her. Hence, assuming that freedom is an indispensable moral
value for all agents, since agents cannot be agents unless they are free to act in
accordance with their own chosen ends, no such restriction could be morally justified
unless it is indeed necessary.
Now necessity has different implications as regards the extension of negative
and positive duties, respectively. In order for all agents to have effective rights to life and
physical integrity it is necessary that each and every agent always refrains from killing
and assaulting other agents. Hence, all agents have at least a prima facie duty not to
physically harm each other. (I say prima facie, since this duty could be overridden in
cases in which one agent has to harm another agent in order to prevent the latter agent
from unjustifiably harming her. Here too, necessity plays an important role, as the
expression “has to” suggests.)
Things are different with positive duties, however. We do not always depend on
the help of others, and, hence, it is not true that all agents always have a duty to provide
all other agents with help. It is not necessary that each and every agent always helps other
agents. Hence, positive duties do not apply with the same degree of universality as do the
negative duties. As John Stuart Mill observed, “a person may possibly not need the
benefits of others, but he always needs that they should not do him hurt” (Mill 1987
[1863]: 78).
Hence, in the case of the duty to rescue, we have to establish that there is indeed
a necessary relation between some agent A’s performing a certain act of assistance and
some other agent B’s being able to stay alive, maintain her freedom, health and physical
integrity, or any other similar aspect of her basic well-being. This involves establishing
both that a particular action is necessary to maintain B’s basic well-being and that it is
necessary that A performs this action. For instance, if B is about to drown, it is necessary
that someone pulls her out of the water. If only A and C are present, and C cannot swim,
while A is a good swimmer who is capable of rescuing B on her own, then it is necessary
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that A rescues B. Hence, A and not C has a duty to rescue B. Here the necessity is of an
objective kind, having to do with the facts of the case, rather than with what people think
or believe about the situation.
The reason for this Requirement of Double Objective Necessity is, once again, to
make sure that duties are assigned with due respect for the human right to freedom.
Unless it is indeed necessary for the saving of some person’s life or other aspects of her
basic well-being that a certain agent performs a certain rescue action, that agent should
not be burdened with a duty to perform that rescue action.
However, for an agent A to have a positive duty to act for the sake of
maintaining another agent B’s well-being, A’s action should not only be necessary to the
maintaining of B’s well-being, but A should also be aware of this necessity. We may call
this the Requirement of Subjective Necessity. If, for instance, a potential rescuer is asleep
and hence unaware of there being a person about to drown in the lake close to her
cottage, it would be unfair to ascribe to her a duty to rescue that person. We cannot
accuse her of having ignored the drowning person’s plight, since ignoring presupposes
prior awareness. And we cannot accuse her of neglecting her duty by falling asleep, since
she was never under any obligation to stay awake in the first place. (Of course, things
would be different for agents who have voluntarily contracted themselves to protect other
persons from harm. A lifeguard, for instance, who is employed to keep a certain beach
area safe, has thereby also committed herself to be alert and informed about what is
happening in that area.)
In addition to the requirements of double necessity and subjective necessity,
positive duties must also fulfill a Requirement of Reasonable Costs. Positive duties,
including the duty to rescue, are not without limits. Duties of assistance assume, in
accordance with the Kantian motto that ought implies can, that the assisting agent is
capable of performing them. No one should be required to do the impossible. But there
are further limits to be considered. The assisting agent must not be reduced to a mere
means to the securing of the well-being of the person in need. While trying to help
someone else to avoid harm, the helping agent still maintains her own rights not to be
harmed. Hence, although a potential rescuer might be aware that another person is about
to drown, and that it is necessary that she intervenes to rescue him, she might still be
justified in not acting, if she has reason to believe that she would be harmed should she
try to do so. Of course, things are different for agents who, like bodyguards, lifeguards,
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firemen, and others, have voluntarily contracted themselves to take risks to protect other
people. Likewise, parents, friends, and lovers can be expected to take at least some risks
for the sake of protecting children, and loved ones. But in the absence of such special
relationships, agents are not required to risk any aspect of their basic well-being for the
sake of maintaining the basic well-being of other agents. We will attend to this
requirement in more detail below.
SINGER’S SUFFICIENCY CONDITION AND ITS PROBLEMS
Now, Singer plays down the importance of necessity by rejecting any distinction
“between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases
in which I am just one among millions in the same position.” According to him, my duty
to rescue does not require that a person in danger will die unless I intervene. What
matters to Singer is that I am able to save that person, not that I am the only one who is
able to save her. Hence, the duty to rescue, in Singer’s version, is based on the sufficiency
rather than on the necessity of the rescuer’s intervention.
Of course, it is easy to sympathize with the sufficiency condition, especially if
we consider certain possible interpretations of the necessity argument that I have
developed above. Think of ten potential rescuers, each one of whom is capable of
effortlessly rescuing a drowning child. Now, according to one interpretation of the
necessity argument, since it is not necessary for any one of them to rescue the child (since
anyone of the others could do it instead), no one of them will have a moral duty to rescue
the child. And since the same conclusion holds for each and every one of them, these ten
potential rescuers may passively watch the child drown without anyone of them having
violated the duty to rescue. This outcome would probably appear appalling to most of us.
Accordingly, we might feel tempted to accept Singer’s sufficiency condition instead.
According to this condition, each and every one of the ten potential rescuers
would have a duty to rescue the child, since it would be true for each and every one of
them that her intervention would be sufficient to save the child’s life. Instead of there
being no one with a duty to rescue the child, all of the potential rescuers will now have a
duty to rescue the child, and this outcome may appear more appealing, morally speaking.
(We will discuss an alternative way of dealing with the problem of many potential
rescuers and necessity below.)
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However, Singer’s choice of sufficiency rather than necessity as the relevant
justification of the duty to rescue will bring problems of its own. This is so especially
within the framework of a utilitarian theory, according to which “we ought to be
preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable
moral importance” (Singer 1972: 238). According to this utilitarian approach, it is
morally bad to spend one’s money on fashion clothes which are not really needed to keep
oneself warm, when one could give this money to famine relief instead. But the utilitarian
would also have to compare and evaluate different rescue operations according to how
well they serve the purpose of maximizing the prevention of suffering. A possible
outcome of this quantitative approach is that there may well be occasions in which we
should not try to save the drowning child after all. Consider this example.
You are on your way to the post office to mail a sum of money that you know
will save the lives of five starving persons in a far away country, when you observe that a
child is about to drown in a nearby pond. You can easily, and without any risks to
yourself, pull the child out of the water, but in the meantime the post office will close,
and you will not be able to save the lives of the five starving persons. But if you do not
pull the child out of the water now, she will die. You know this. So, what should you do?
If you are a utilitarian who, like Singer, wants to maximize the prevention of suffering,
then you should not stop to pull the child out of the water, but instead leave her to drown
and hurry on to get to the post office in time. This outcome, however, would appear
morally outrageous to many of us.
If we instead had relied on a necessity condition, we would have reached a
different outcome. Then we would be able to argue that while your intervention may be
sufficient to save either the child or the five starving persons, your intervention is
necessary to save the child. Somebody else may contribute the money needed to save the
five starving persons, but only you can save this child from drowning. The very fact that
money is the instrument of rescue in the case of the starving persons suggests that the
important thing is not that you intervene, but that somebody intervenes. It is money that is
required, not your money in particular. And it is highly unlikely that you are the only one
who could contribute the money needed to save the starving five. Hence, it would seem
unreasonable to insist that just because your money would be sufficient to save the five
starving persons, you and you alone are morally responsible for whether they survive or
not.
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Moreover, assuming that you have no special responsibility for these five
starving persons and that your intention is to save five starving persons, rather than to
save these five persons in particular, then it is not necessary that you send any money
today. You can mail your money tomorrow instead, and still manage to save the lives of
five starving persons, although, of course, the beneficiaries then will not be the same
individuals as today.
In the case of the child in the pond, however, it is indeed your personal
intervention that determines whether this particular child will live or die. You are the
only one who can save the child. Hence, if you leave the child to drown for the sake of
getting in time to the post office and mail your money to save the five starving persons,
you ignore a determinate moral duty for the sake of performing an action that you have
no duty at all to perform. That is, you ignore a duty that only you have, and which must
be fulfilled here and now, for an act of beneficence that can be performed by any agent at
any time. The starving persons have certainly a right to be saved, but it is not as clear that
the corresponding duty to save them can be assigned to any individual agent in particular.
The drowning child, however, has not only a right to be rescued, but a right to be rescued
by you.
Now, the fact that in this case you should rescue one child instead of saving the
lives of five starving persons does not mean that numbers never count, morally speaking.
But they count only when factors such as moral proximity and necessity of intervention
do not make a moral difference. If, for instance, I am facing a situation in which one child
is about to drown in one pond and five children are about to drown in another pond, and
in which I can save either the one child or the five children, but not all the children, then I
should begin by trying to save the five children, hoping that I, contrary to the evidence at
hand, will be able to save both them and the child in the other pond. Here it should of
course be added that that this is my duty only if it is true both that I have no special
obligations regarding the one child, and that my intervention is indeed necessary to the
survival of the five children.
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DOING MORE THAN OUR FAIR SHARE?
Now, even if we grant that it is necessity rather than sufficiency that creates a moral duty
to rescue, we would still have the problem briefly noted above of assigning that duty to a
particular agent when there is more than one potential rescuer around. For instance, let us
assume that both you and I are equally capable of rescuing a person in danger, and that it
is necessary that one of us intervenes to do so. None of us is a lifeguard, so the question
of special responsibilities does not occur. Now, it is not necessary that you intervene,
since I am as capable as you are of performing the rescue operation. Nor is it necessary
that I intervene, since you are as capable as I am of rescuing the person in danger. Here
we will end up with a paradoxical situation in which although one of us should have a
duty to rescue, none of us will in fact have such a duty. This was the kind of contingency
that Singer wanted to avoid by insisting on sufficiency rather than necessity, and by
arguing that we should make no distinction “between cases in which I am the only person
who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the
same position” (Singer 1972: 232).
One way of approaching this problem about moral indeterminacy would of
course be to claim that you and I have a shared duty to rescue. According to this view,
when we are members of a group of potential rescuers, we have only a duty to do our fair
share of our collective duty to rescue. This means that if the other members of the group
fail or ignore to do their part, we are still morally obligated to do only as much as our
share of our common duty prescribes. We are supposed to contribute our fair share
regardless of what the others do or do not do, but we are not supposed to compensate for
what they fail to do by accepting a heavier burden for ourselves. In the words of Liam
Murphy: “We should do our fair share, which can amount to a great sacrifice in certain
circumstances; what we cannot be required to do is other people’s shares as well as our
own” (Murphy 1993: 278).
However, this idea of being morally obligated to do only one’s fair share of the
duty to rescue incurs certain intuitive moral objections. Suppose that you and I are near a
pond where two children are about to drown. Once again, none of us is a lifeguard or has
any other kind of special responsibility for the children. I can easily and at no cost to
myself save both of them, but since you are as capable as I am of rescuing them, I believe
that I should do only my fair share of rescuing. Hence, I choose to save only one child.
You, however, who do not believe in any duty to rescue others at all, simply walk away.
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The child left in the pond drowns. Can I really take comfort in the belief that since I have
done my fair share of rescuing, the fate of the child that was left to drown is no moral
concern of mine? I believe not.
In order to avoid such morally unappealing outcomes, we should interpret the
necessity argument in a way that takes account of what agents actually do and do not do.
It is not the number of potential rescuers that matters, but what they actually do. If there
is a group of, let us say, ten potential rescuers, none of whom is a lifeguard or in any
other way under a special duty to intervene, and each and every one of them being
capable of rescuing a person about to drown at little cost to themselves, and nine of them
simply refuse to act, then it is necessary that the tenth potential rescuer intervenes to
rescue the drowning person. In such a situation it is as if there had been only one
potential rescuer present in the first place. (But remember the Principle of the Priority of
Special Relationships: If any one of the ten had been personally or contractually
committed to rescue the drowning person, then she, and she alone, would have had the
duty to rescue that person. And even if none of the ten had intervened to save the
drowning person, she, and she alone, would have been guilty of neglecting the duty to
rescue.)
Now, it is important to note that even if an agent is left to take care of a rescue
operation on her own, this does not mean that she is morally obligated to take greater
risks than would have been the case had she shared the rescue operation with other
agents. Our duty to rescue should not be turned into a supererogatory imperative that we
sacrifice our health, physical integrity, or other aspects of our basic well-being, just
because other agents refuse to do their fair share. To be sure, we cannot escape our duty
to rescue, just because other potential rescuers remain passive. But nor are we morally
obligated to risk our lives or other aspects of our basic well-being in order to compensate
for the passivity of others.
If, for instance, we are twenty potential rescuers around and there are twenty
children about to drown in a lake, and each rescuer can save only one child without
herself risking her life or suffering injuries or severe health risks (and none of us is bound
by any prior commitment to take such risks), then I am only morally responsible for the
rescue of one of these children. And this limitation of my duty to rescue should not be
affected by the other potential rescuers’ refusal to intervene. If the other nineteen
potential rescuers remain passive, and, as a consequence of this, nineteen children drown,
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it is they who have failed to fulfill their duty to rescue, not I, and it is they who are to be
blamed for the deaths of these children, not I. This is what the Requirement of
Reasonable Costs is all about. According to this requirement, a rescuer can never be
morally obligated to expose herself to any serious harm for the sake of saving the life of
another person—that is, unless she already has a special responsibility for the well-being
of that person that makes it mandatory for her to intervene, even at the risk of serious
injury to herself. We will now take a more detailed look at the Requirement of
Reasonable Costs.

THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLE COSTS
In a rescue situation the rescuee’s life or other aspects of her basic well-being are at risk.
It is the moral importance of the rescuee’s basic well-being together with the necessity of
a particular rescuer’s intervention that create the latter’s duty to rescue. Now, an agent’s
basic well-being includes those physical and mental conditions without which she either
has no capacity at all for purpose-fulfilling agency or only a generally diminished
capacity for such agency. Thus, if an agent is about to lose her life, or to have her arms or
legs broken, or if she is about to be made the victim of terrorizing fears and anxieties, or
to suffer any other kind of injury or loss of health, then her basic well-being is being
threatened.
According to a famous argument made by the philosopher Alan Gewirth, all
rational agents must hold that they have a right to basic well-being, since basic wellbeing is necessary to the very possibility of agency. To claim a right to something,
Gewirth tells us, is to hold that one cannot accept being deprived of that thing. And
agents cannot accept being deprived of basic well-being, since they necessarily must
intend to be successful in achieving the ends of their actions. Hence, all agents must
claim a right to basic well-being (Gewirth 1978: 78–82). It is the rescuee’s right to basic
well-being that provides the moral background for the duty to rescue. And it is the
rescuer’s right to basic well-being that provides morally justified limits to that duty. In
my account of the Requirement of Reasonable Costs below, I will take my point of
departure in Gewirth’s argument about an agency-related right to basic well-being.
I have two reasons for doing so. First, his theory of agency-based moral rights
contains a carefully developed argument that makes it fundamentally different from many
“intuitionist” rights theories, that merely assert the existence of certain rights without
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providing an argument for them. Second, his theory will enable us to view the rescuer as
well as the rescuee as bearers of possibly conflicting rights, rather than reducing the
rescuer to an instrument to the maximizing of good outcomes. This is relevant here, since
the moral evaluation of a rescue situation should involve an assessment not only of the
needs of the rescuee, but also of the sacrifices expected from the rescuer. To view the
rescuer as a rights-holder rather than just as a potential source of help to the rescuee is an
important step on the way to a realistic and balanced discussion of the duty to rescue.
According to Gewirth, there should exist an equality of rights among agents.
Hence, there must be limits to the sacrifices that can be required of an agent for the sake
of protecting another agent’s rights. These limits are expressed by Gewirth in terms of
comparable costs:
By ‘comparable cost’ is meant that he is not required to risk his own
life or other basic goods in order to save another person’s life or other
basic goods, and similarly with the other components of the necessary
goods of action. To engage in such risk or to incur such cost would
involve the possibility or actuality of losing his own life in order to
save theirs, and this, rather than maintaining an equality of generic
rights, would generate an inequality in his recipient’s favor (…).
(Gewirth 1978: 218)
The argument about comparable costs expresses the idea that the potential rescuer’s basic
well-being is as important to the potential rescuer as is the rescuee’s basic well-being to
the rescuee. Hence, our duty to assist does not override our right to protect our own basic
well-being.
Still, it is not quite clear how Gewirth wants us to apply his argument. The
quotation above, referring to the principle that an agent “is not required to risk his own
life or other basic goods in order to save another person’s life or other basic goods,” gives
room for two different interpretations, one, which I will call the hierarchical
interpretation, and another, which I will call the inclusive interpretation.
According to the hierarchical interpretation, there is a hierarchy within the
category of basic well-being, according to which a rescuer is morally obligated to risk
less important aspects of her basic well-being for the sake of protecting more important
aspects of the rescuee’s basic well-being. Hence, although the rescuer is not expected to
risk neither her life to save the rescuee’s life, nor her arm or leg to save the rescuee’s arm
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or leg, she is expected to risk her arm or her leg if this is necessary to save the rescuee’s
life.
According to the inclusive interpretation, basic well-being should be considered
as a whole. Hence, agents are never morally obligated to sacrifice any part of their basic
well-being for the sake of preserving any part of another person’s basic well-being. That
is, granted that basic well-being includes physical integrity in general, an agent is not
expected to risk neither her life, nor her leg, nor her arm, for the sake of saving another
person’s life.
Now, Gewirth’s only detailed example of a rescue situation does not give us
much guidance as regards the sacrifices prescribed by his argument about comparable
costs. In this example, a man named Carr is strolling on the beach when he observes
another man Davis struggling in the water, shouting for help. Carr is an excellent
swimmer and has also his motorboat near him, and to this motorboat there is attached a
long and stout rope. The story continues:
Carr sees that he could easily save Davis by swimming out to him, or at
least by throwing him the rope from his boat. But Carr simply doesn’t
want to bother even though he is aware that Davis will probably drown
unless he rescues him. Davis drowns. (Gewirth 1978: 217–18)
The reason why this example cannot give us any clue as to how to interpret Gewirth on
comparable costs is simply that it would not cost Carr anything to save Davis. He would
not risk his physical integrity or health, nor would he risk his property. So if we want to
find out what risks a potential rescuer should be ready to accept for herself, the story of
Carr and Davis is totally uninformative.
However, I believe we should define the contents of the Requirement of
Reasonable Costs along the lines of the inclusive interpretation above. After all, given
that Gewirth is right about the necessity of basic well-being to agency in general, it
cannot be reasonably expected of an agent that she should give up any part of that wellbeing, unless she has voluntarily committed herself to such sacrifices in the first place. It
would be to cross the line between the mandatory and the supererogatory to demand of an
agent that she should, for instance, accept for herself a life in a wheelchair for the sake of
saving another person’s life. And just as it is out of the question that any agent should
have to accept to have her limbs broken by a rescuee trying to save her life, it is out of the
question that any agent should be required to break her own limbs for the sake of saving a
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rescuee’s life. Basic well-being in its entirety, including not only life but also physical
integrity and health, should be kept inviolate.
However, even on this interpretation of the Requirement of Reasonable Costs,
rescuing agents may, under certain circumstances, still be under a duty to risk their basic
well-being. This brings us back to special relationships and the responsibilities that come
with them, according to the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships. If you have
volunteered to become a police officer, bodyguard, or lifeguard, you have also
volunteered to risk severe costs to yourself for the sake of protecting other people. And a
parent, who has a special responsibility for her children, may also be assumed to risk
physical harm for the sake of protecting their lives. But in the absence of such special
conditions, we are not supposed to expose ourselves to the risk of being killed or injured
for the sake of saving another person’s life.
We should also note that the Requirement of Reasonable Costs will rule out
rescue operations that are dangerous to the rescuing agent, not only because the operation
itself is risky, but also because the person to be rescued is dangerous and can be expected
to cause the rescuing agent or third parties to suffer unjustified harm, should she be
rescued. For the same reason that a potential rescuer is not under an obligation to risk
losing her life or breaking her arms or legs in a dangerous rescue operation, she is not
under an obligation to rescue a person who can be expected to kill, injure, or terrorize her
or anyone else in the future. The term ‘unjustified harm’ is meant to make clear that we
are here thinking of a morally innocent potential rescuer, who ought not to be subjected
to any harm at the hands of the person in need of being rescued. If, for instance, the
potential rescuer is a thief, and the person in need of rescue intends to report her to the
police should she be rescued, then this would not constitute “unjustified harm” and the
potential rescuer cannot refer to the possibility that she will suffer morally justified legal
punishment as a justification for not rescuing the other person.
What about rescue operations that are not dangerous to the rescuing agent but
that are extremely difficult or inconvenient to perform? Judith Jarvis Thomson gives the
imaginary example of herself being “sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my
life is the touch of Henry Fonda’s cool hand on my fevered brow,” concluding that
although it would be “frightfully nice” of Fonda to fly in from the West Coast and
provide her with the cure of his cool hand, she still has no right to his help (Thomson
1971: 55). But although it might be highly inconvenient for Henry Fonda to travel to
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Thomson’s sickbed, it can hardly constitute a threat to his basic well-being to do so.
Hence, assuming that Thomson is right about the unique powers of Fonda’s cool hand,
should we not conclude that he indeed has a duty to fly in from the West Coast and save
her life?
However, I do believe that Thomson is right in denying that she has a right to
Fonda’s intervention, although this intervention in no way would interfere with Fonda’s
right to basic well-being. The relevant aspect of the argument is not that Fonda’s right to
basic well-being would be threatened, but rather that his right to freedom would be
infringed, should we accept that Thomson has a moral right to his presence at her
sickbed. This is not like a case in which Fonda on his way to work comes across
Thomson drowning in a lake and, given that it is both necessary and without risks for him
to intervene, acquires a duty to rescue her. In Thomson’s story he would have a duty not
only to rescue her, but also a duty to arrange his life so that he can be present at her side
when she needs him. And in the absence of any prior commitment to make himself
available to Thomson at her request, Fonda has no duty to arrange his life in accordance
with her needs.
On the other hand, if he had already been in the same room as Thomson, I would
say that he has a moral duty to walk across the floor and place his magic hand on her
fevered brow. Then the whole case would be similar to any ordinary rescue situation, in
which a potential rescuer is already present when the need of her intervention becomes
obvious. (Thomson, however, denies that Fonda would have a duty to do even this much,
although she believes he ought to make the minimal effort of crossing the room to place
his hand on her brow [Thomson 1971: 61].) This has to do with her belief that rights and
duties have to do with requirements of justice rather than with morally right action in
general.

THE DUTY TO AID THE STARVING
Now, where does this leave us when it comes to the justification of a duty to aid victims
of famines across the globe? We have so far argued that the duty to rescue must fulfill
certain conditions, expressed in the Requirement of Double Objective Necessity, the
Requirement of Subjective Necessity, and the Requirement of Reasonable Costs. We
have also noted that the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships in some cases,
in which the rights of rescuees conflict with each other, will require that we rescue some
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persons rather than others. The same principle also requires that we sometimes take
greater risks than is normally demanded by the Requirement of Reasonable Costs in order
to save persons to whom we are morally committed in one way or another.
Applying the Requirement of Double Objective Necessity to a famine case
involves establishing that a certain kind of intervention made by a particular agent is
necessary to end the famine in question. Now, in a rescue situation, like the one with a
child about to drown in a shallow pond, it is fairly straightforward what must be done:
Someone should wade in and pull the child out of the water. It is not equally
straightforward what must be done in order to put an end to a famine. Since people are
starving it might be thought that what is needed is that someone distributes food to them.
And if it had only been a matter of some individual suddenly finding herself without
anything to eat because she has been robbed of her food as well as of the contents of her
purse, then one of her neighbours may well solve her problem by giving her food for a
day or two until she can gain access to her bank account and buy food for herself. But
this is not what famines look like. It is not a matter of a few individuals suddenly and
temporarily being deprived of food. It is rather a matter of large groups of people being
deprived of their long-term ability to provide for themselves.
In famines individual agents are no longer capable of feeding themselves and
sometimes they are also prevented from doing so. But the reason for this threat to their
lives and to their agency is not some accident that just happened to them as individuals
(as when a child falls into a pond), but more likely an effect of how the political and
social institutions of their country work or fail to work. Famine-stricken people are not
persons who have suddenly lost their food supplies. More likely, they are the victims of
structural evils, like an oppressive political system that does not allow for functioning
markets (like in Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China, or Pol Pot’s Cambodia), or civil wars and
terrorism, that deprive people of their property and homes, forcing them into a precarious
existence as refugees (like in Darfur and Somalia).
Even in the absence of violence and lawlessness, famines seem to be the product
of political conditions and structures, rather than just a shortage of food. Famines may
actually coexist with an abundance of food in one and the same country. This was the
case in Ireland in the 1840s, as well as in Ethiopia in the 1970s. Here indifferent colonial
administrators and autocratic rulers left impoverished people to die, while food was being
exported abroad or sold to wealthy city consumers in a neighbouring region (Sen 1999:
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170–75). In these cases, the poor starved simply because they could not afford to pay for
the food that was actually available.
It might be objected that governments of developing countries may lack
resources to protect its citizens from famines. But the fact that famines often occur in
developing countries does not necessarily imply that the governments of these countries
have no money to spend on the protection of their citizens’ well-being. Rather, it can be
an indication that these governments have other priorities.
In 1994 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) revealed in its
annual Human Development Report how governments of developing countries (mis)used
resources under their control. In that year, developing countries spent $125 billion on
military expenses. For only 12% of that cost, they would have been able not only to
provide primary health care for all their citizens, including immunization of all children,
but also to eliminate severe malnutrition and reduce moderate malnutrition by half, and to
provide safe drinking water for all. For only 4% of their military spending, the
developing countries would have been able to reduce adult illiteracy by half, to provide
universal primary education, and to educate women to the same level as men (UNDP
1994: 50).
Governments that prefer to spend money on the military rather than on health
care and education are often themselves controlled by the military. Here one should note
the significant relationship between the presence of democracy and the absence of
famine. As philosopher and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has pointed out, “no substantial
famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of
government and a relatively free press” (Sen 1999: 152). A government depending for its
power on the will of its citizens must take their rights seriously. Such a government is
likely to act to prevent unemployment and poverty from turning into a famine. For
instance, by creating temporary jobs and maintaining the purchasing power of the poor, a
government can prevent local food markets from collapsing and enable the poor to
survive.
Hence, famines are not just about people lacking food, but also, and more
important, about their lacking the structural conditions for successful agency, including a
democratic political community with a government that respects its citizens’ civic rights.
In the words of philosopher James Griffin:

The Duty to Rescue and the Duty to Aid the Starving 29
[W]e have good empirical evidence to believe that in a famine there is
usually enough food in the stricken country to keep all the population
alive; it is just that the starving have no effective way of getting at it.
We also have reason to believe that liberal democracies are less likely
than countries with other forms of government to suffer serious famine.
And we have reason to believe that rushing food to an area of famine is
often only a short-term palliative. What is needed in these countries for
long-term improvement is often deep political change. (Griffin 2008:
183)
To end a famine and to restore its victims to their rights may certainly require some kind
of external intervention. But this intervention will not be of the same kind as we came
across in the case of the drowning child.
When the rescuer has pulled the child out of the water, the child is safe and the
rescue mission has been successfully completed, end of story. In cases like these, one
individual can intervene and successfully rescue another individual. However, you cannot
end a famine in a similar fashion, by having some individuals providing some other
individuals with food. Certainly, the starving persons who receive food will survive
today. But tomorrow they will starve again. And there will be others, who never received
any food, and who will not even survive until tomorrow. “Unlike holding out your hand
to save the drowning child, helping someone in need generally requires a major
investment of time and resources” (Lichtenberg 2004: 85).
To go on indefinitely in this way, feeding a few people here, a few people there,
is not to end a famine. There is no successful completion of a well-defined rescue mission
here, no end of story. It is more like taking painkillers against cancer. The symptoms may
be alleviated, but the illness is still there, and it is still a killer. We need surgery, not
painkillers. And when it comes to successfully fighting a famine, what is required is a
change of those human-made political, social, cultural, and economic structures that
made the famine possible in the first place. Unlike the rescuing of a drowning baby,
relieving famine victims involves engaging oneself with a whole societal structure.
In the words of philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah:
[R]esponding to the crisis of a child dying because her frail body
cannot absorb fluids faster than they pour out of her is not really saving
her, if tomorrow she will eat the same poor food, drink the same
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infected water, and live in a country with the same incompetent
government; if the government’s economic policies continue to block
real development for her family and her community; if her country is
still trapped in poverty in part because our government has imposed
tariffs on some of their exports to protect American manufacturers with
a well-organized lobbying group in Washington, while the European
Union saves jobs for its people by placing quotas on the importation of
others. (Appiah 2006: 167–68)
Accordingly, when it comes to understanding famines and how to fight them, we should
not let ourselves be trapped by simplistic arguments, telling us that the problem with
starving people is just that they do not have enough to eat, and that we can deal with it by
sending them food or give them money to buy food for. Instead, what is needed is a
change of the political, social, cultural, and economic background conditions that prevent
them from being able to provide for themselves in the first place: “The focus has to be on
the economic power and substantive freedom of individuals and families to buy enough
food, and not just on the quantum of food in the country in question” (Sen 1999: 161).

THE DUTIES OF GOVERNMENTS
The focus on the structural causes of famines also indicates that it is not individuals but
rather governments that will have the duty to aid the starving. The means and instruments
necessary to end a famine are normally not available to any individual or group of
individuals outside the circles of political power. And regardless of the abilities of
individuals, it is governments that have the moral duty to provide their citizens with an
institutional framework that protects them from societal failures such as famines. This
duty has both negative and positive aspects. Negatively, governments have a duty to their
citizens not to expose them to oppression and violence of the kind that make them likely
victims of famines. Positively, governments have a duty to promote functioning markets
as well as prospects for growth and employment that enable citizens to support
themselves.
Governments should also act to protect their citizens’ basic well-being when
they are unable to provide for themselves, by means of training and education, temporary
employment, or welfare support. Moreover, governments have a duty to maintain
democratic structures and freedom of opinion and expression, and to make themselves
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receptive to the legitimate demands of their citizens. In short, governments have a
responsibility to establish and maintain a political culture protective of their citizens’
rights to freedom and well-being. The existence of famines indicates a failure to take this
responsibility seriously: “A government’s allowing people to starve when it is
preventable reflects a lack of concern for human rights” (Rawls 2001: 109).
Here the Requirement of Double Objective Necessity as well as the Principle of
the Priority of Special Relationships both point in the same direction. Without the
intervention of governments famines cannot be put to an end, and governments have a
duty to protect the basic well-being of their citizens that no other government has. With
political sovereignty comes moral responsibilities and among these responsibilities the
duty to protect its citizens from starvation should be at the very top of any government’s
agenda. The duty of a government to maintain its citizens’ right to basic well-being
corresponds directly to its own claim to be a morally legitimate authority in a particular
territory with a right to the loyalty of its citizens. There can be no morally legitimate
exercise of political power in the absence of a willingness to accept such a duty.
Hence, just as in the case in which the lifeguard becomes the one agent among
many potential and capable rescuers who has the moral duty to rescue a drowning person,
so it is the government of a famine-stricken country and no other agent that has the moral
duty to maintain, protect, and restore the basic well-being of its citizens. If the
government in question has the means to do this and yet refuses to aid its own citizens,
then the government and no other agent should be blamed for the deaths and sufferings of
these citizens. From the point of view of moral responsibility, the correct description of a
situation in which people die in a famine that the local government could have prevented
but ignored is that they died because their own government ignored its duties and allowed
this to happen, not because other governments did not send any aid (even if the latter
would be true, too).
But what if a government is genuinely unable and not just unwilling to help its
starving citizens? In such a case it might be necessary for some other government to
intervene and to help creating those institutional structures that are necessary to prevent
famines, including a democratic constitution and a functioning market. However, such an
intervention implies a far-reaching interference with the political and economical life of
the recipient country and it should only be undertaken if the greater part of the citizenry
of that country can be expected to welcome it or at least accept it. Otherwise foreign aid
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might be perceived as just another instance of imperialism. As already the French
revolutionaries found out, when they sent their armies to spread republican virtue all over
Europe, forcing freedom upon others is very often counterproductive.
Moreover, according to the Requirement of Reasonable Costs, no other country
is under any moral duty to risk the basic well-being of its own citizens for the sake of
promoting or protecting the basic well-being of citizens of another country. This
precludes a duty to go to war only for the sake of creating democratic structures in
another country. Hence, even if it would be necessary to intervene militarily in a faminestricken country to change the structures that caused the famine in the first place, and
even if it would be possible for a particular government of another country to undertake
such a military intervention successfully, this government will still have no moral duty to
do it, if it is likely that its citizens and soldiers will be killed or wounded in the process.
No government is under any moral obligation to sacrifice the lives of its own citizens
only for the sake of saving the lives of citizens of other countries (that is, unless the
government in question, with the support of its citizens, has voluntarily committed itself
to make such sacrifices). On the contrary, governments have a moral duty to protect the
basic well-being of their own citizens. (This is the duty that the governments of faminestricken countries typically fail.)
The fact that we, as citizens of a democratic political community, make laws and
political decisions that affect each others’ lives gives us a moral responsibility for each
others’ well-being that we do not have for the well-being of members of other nations.
Hence, according to the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships, we have a
moral duty to see to it that our fellow citizens have their basic well-being protected by the
laws we make and the institutions we create, but we have no similar duty to protect the
basic well-being of members of other nations. Likewise, our duty to rectify an injustice in
our own political community is greater than our duty to rectify a similar injustice in
another political community, and should not be set aside just because it would be easier
or cheaper to rectify that latter injustice:
A participant in the process of collective self-rule ought to treat the
relief of an important burden suffered by a compatriot due to the
system of laws that she helps to impose as a stronger reason to change
the laws than an unmet need of a foreigner, even one that can be
satisfied more efficiently than her compatriot’s need. To fail to accept
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this special responsibility for reducing burdens that one would
otherwise help to impose coercively is to fail properly to disvalue
political subordination. It is as disrespectful as an overlord’s telling his
exploited serfs that his exactions are justified by his using them to
improve the well-being of the more miserable serfs of a fellow-baron.
(Miller 2004: 105–6)
However, none of this precludes a duty to aid the government of another political
community in its efforts to protect its citizens from becoming the victims of a famine if
and when such aid can be given without forgoing any aspect of the basic well-being of
one’s fellow citizens. For it to be a moral duty, such aid should, however, according to
the Requirement of Double Objective Necessity, consist in providing means that are
indeed necessary to the prevention or ending of a famine.
Such necessary aid could, for instance, consist in creating more favourable
conditions of trade for a country threatened with a famine, so that its economic growth is
not being hampered. It could also consist in helping the government of a famine-stricken
country to provide its citizens with education and other forms of training that would
enable them to support themselves. Providing loans for investment in local agricultural or
industrial projects could also be a relevant way of fulfilling the duty to aid a faminestricken nation. However, all forms of aid should aim at enabling the receiving people to
support themselves and to regain their capacity for agency, rather than having them
depend on future aid, which would be contrary to the right to freedom of the giver as well
as the receiver of aid. And for this aid to be meaningful, there must already exist
democratic structures in the receiving state, so that the government of that state can be
held accountable to its citizens and in this way be motivated to assume a responsibility
for their basic well-being. To aid a government that does not respect its citizens as agents
with political rights is not a way to protect these citizens from famine but rather to make
permanent those structural conditions which cause famines in the first place.
According to the Requirements of Double Objective Necessity and Subjective
Necessity, any government the aid of which is necessary to prevent or end a particular
famine, and in which there is an awareness of the need for its aid, has a duty to provide
aid in the way described above, as long as this is consistent with the basic well-being of
its own citizens. However, it has been argued that some governments and nations may
have a greater responsibility than others when it comes to providing aid for certain poor
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countries. In the eyes of philosopher Thomas Pogge, for instance, citizens of rich and
developed countries have benefited from global inequality and from the exploitation of
poor Third World countries:
[B]y shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and
avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are
harming the global poor—or, to put it more descriptively, we are active
participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against
humanity ever committed. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were vastly
more evil than our political leaders, but in terms of killing and harming
people they never came anywhere near causing 18 million deaths per
year. (Pogge 2005: 33)
Hence, according to Pogge, the citizens of rich countries have a negative duty to help
these poor countries, that is, to stop harming them and to rectify the effects of past
exploitation. Given the prevailing intuition that it is worse to harm other persons than not
to help them, and given the common sense view that while we do not always have a duty
to help others, we do always have a duty not to harm them, Pogge wants us to think of the
duty to aid the starving not as an optional commitment, but rather as a mandatory moral
obligation. When we ponder our duties to the global poor we should, according to Pogge,
think of ourselves not as innocent witnesses to a scene in which a baby is about to drown
in a pond, but rather as culpable agents who shoved the baby into the pond in the first
place and who therefore now have a moral duty of rectification to see to it that she is
rescued.
Now, Pogge’s argument is different from the one analysed here, about the duty
to aid the starving as an extension of the duty to rescue, and so it is beyond the scope of
this article to address the complexities of his argument about moral guilt and
responsibility. Let me just point to one major difficulty in relating the duty to aid the
global poor to past exploitation. In order to bring home his conclusion that all citizens of
rich and developed countries have a duty of compensation to aid the global poor, Pogge
has to show that each and every citizen of rich and developed countries has in fact
benefited from exploiting the global poor. It would, of course, seem morally
unreasonable to demand compensation from persons who themselves have neither
exploited anyone, nor profited from their ancestors’ past exploitation. However, this also
seriously weakens the impact of Pogge’s argument. In the words of philosopher Janna
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Thompson:
The idea that people share responsibility for a past injustice by
benefiting from it has an obvious shortcoming. If an injustice produces
no benefits for existing people, then on this account they have no
responsibility. (Thompson 2006: 158)
Moreover, to whom is compensation owed? Is each and every Third World citizen owed
compensation, regardless of whether her present condition would have been better or
worse without the past and present impact of global economic inequalities? Given these
and other questions concerning the implications of Pogge’s argument for the duty to aid
the global poor, his argument seems even more problematic than Singer’s attempt to
derive that duty from the duty to rescue.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
While both the duty to rescue and the duty to aid the starving relate to the moral necessity
of averting grave threats to the basic well-being of human agents, the latter duty cannot
be reduced to just an extension of the former one, as Peter Singer has argued. In this
article I have tried to show why this is so.
(1) In order not to impose undue restrictions on the right to freedom, both duties
must fulfill the Requirement of Double Objective Necessity. Unless it is necessary to
rescue or to aid, no agent has a duty to rescue or to aid. And unless it is necessary that
this particular agent intervenes to rescue or to aid, she has no duty to do so. Now,
although it may happen that it is indeed necessary that a particular agent intervenes to
rescue another individual, it is rarely ever the case that it is necessary that a particular
individual intervenes to aid famine-stricken people in another country. The kind of
intervention necessary to end or prevent a famine typically require governments rather
than individuals as agents. Hence, when the duty to aid is subjected to the same necessity
requirement as the duty to rescue should be subjected to, it turns out that the duty to aid is
unlikely to be a duty of individual agents.
(2) The duty to rescue is also limited by the Requirement of Reasonable Costs,
which says that no agent is required to risk her own basic well-being for the sake of
protecting another agent’s basic well-being (that is, unless the rescuing agent has already
committed herself to such risks). Applied to the duty to aid the starving, this means that
no government has any duty to risk any aspect of its own citizens’ basic well-being for
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the sake of helping famine-stricken people in another country. This means that although it
might be possible for a particular government to end a famine in another country, it may
still have no moral duty to do so. For instance, if the only way to end the famine is to
intervene militarily, and if such an intervention is likely to cost the intervening forces
many dead and wounded soldiers, then this would go beyond the limits set by the
Requirement of Reasonable Costs.
(3) Contrary to the unrestricted universalism of the Singer Principle, agents can
have duties to certain specific individuals or groups of individuals in accordance with the
Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships which they do not have in relation to
other people. In the case of a conflict, these special duties override other persons’ claims
on their help. Likewise, governments have duties to their own citizens that they do not
have to other people, and in the case of a conflict they have to attend to their own
citizens’ basic well-being before considering what to do to help people in other countries.
(4) Because of the Principle of the Priority of Special Relationships, we are also
entitled to hold governments responsible for what happens to their famine-stricken
citizens. If a government fails to do what it can do to protect its citizens from becoming
the victims of a famine (or, even worse, if a government actually causes the famine out of
carelessness or malicious intent), then this government and no other agent should be held
responsible for the ensuing suffering and deaths. The correct description here is that these
famine-stricken people suffered and died because of what their government did to them
or failed to do for them, not because of the failure of other governments to provide aid
(although it may be true that no aid was given by other governments). Only when
governments are unable and not just unwilling to protect their citizens’ rights to basic
well-being will there be a question about the moral responsibility of other governments.
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